We present a declarative and procedural semantics for an amalgamation of object language and metalanguage. We define the class of definite metalogic programs, based on a definite clause language, a binary demonstration predicate, and a naming scheme with both primitive and structured names. The declarative semantics is an extension of the semantics of logic programs dealing with multiple theories and names. The procedural semantics uses a resolution rule and a meta-level to object-level reflection rule.
Introduction
Meta-programming is an active area of investigation in the logic programming community. It is concerned with proving properties of meta-programs, (programs which manipulate other programs), as well as with using 'metalogical' notions to provide more expressive programming languages. Of particular interest are languages which amalgamate their object language and metalanguage to some extent. In this paper, we look at the foundations of amalgamated logic programming building directly on the foundations of logic programming.
Amalgamating object language and metalanguage means having a logical language some of whose expressions are interpreted as statements about the language itself. This approach to logic programming was first advocated by Bowen and Kowalski in [3] .
In this paper, we present an approach to amalgamation, building the foundations of amalgamated logic programming, directly on the foundations of logic programming. We use the term "metalogic language" for the amalgamated language and "metalogic program" for the programs we can write in metalogic languages.
Our approach to amalgamation is to provide a naming relation for the strings of the language as an intrinsic part of the logic, as well as two built-in binary predicates: demo for provability, and names for the naming relation.
Our approach to semantics and to programs is distinguished by explicitly dealing with sets of formulas. A program is a collection of finite sets of clauses and the declarative semantics assigns a model to each set of clauses. These models are not independent of each other: they take account of what is true in other models. The declarative semantics of metalogic programs is an extension of the declarative semantics of logic programs [12] .
The procedural semantics we describe builds on the procedural semantics of logic programs [12] . We use a standard resolution rule and include a rule for meta-level to object-level reflection. The reflection rule is constructive in the sense that it generates bindings for variables, rather than simply testing for refutability.
Our naming scheme for programs has names for many of the strings of a first order language. We have names of symbols, terms, clauses, and sets of clauses. The naming scheme chosen is based on the proposal of Barklund [1] for representing Prolog programs where reserved function symbols are used to form the names of strings of the language. These function symbols form structured names. We also use primitive names: symbols of the language which name a string of the language. We extend this basic scheme in one other way: we include structured names for finite sets of formulas. The naming scheme is powerful enough to name mutually-recursive and self-referential theories.
In the next section, Section 2, we give an introduction to our notions of program and model through several small and simple examples. This is intended only as an informal taste of the approach. Section 3 describes the syntax of first order metalogic languages and the definition of definite metalogic programs. The definition of programs relies on the naming relation for a language which is discussed in detail in Section 4 along with the nature of the amalgamation. Section 5 presents the semantics of first order metalogic and of definite metalogic programs. Section 6 describes the procedural semantics of definite metalogic programs. In Section 7 we describe some other approaches to the semantics of the logic of meta-programming and we conclude in Section 8.
Metalogic Programming
Our aim is to provide foundations for a style of logic programming using a collection of theories to express computations. These theories interact with one another by querying each other about what can be proved. This style of programming lends itself to "structured" logic programming or even object oriented logic programming as investigated by many recent proposals, for example [8, 13, 14] .
We base our work on an amalgamation of object language and metalanguage in the spirit of the proposal made by Bowen and Kowalski [3] . The amalgamated language has terms which (in the intended interpretation) name its own strings.
Here is an example of a metalogic program: t = { p(a, b).
p
(b, c). } s = { q(X, Y) <-r(X, Y) & demo(t, atom(np, X, Y])). r(na, nb). }
In the code fragment above, s and t are the names of the two theories. The equality symbol is being used as a metalanguage notation for binding a name to a theory. This notation is at the meta-level of the amalgamation-it is a convenient way to indicate the binding. The rest of the naming scheme in this example can be explained informally as follows:
The demo/2 atom uses the name of a theory as its first argument and the name of a goal as its second.
The constant np is the name of the predicate symbol p. The function symbol atom/2 is used to construct the names of atoms.
The constants na and nb are the names of a and b respectively.
We allow both structured and primitive names for strings. For example, t and s are primitive names for theories while atom/2 forms structured names of atomic formulas. The ability to have primitive names for theories allows mutually recursive (and self-referential) theories.
Under the semantics we develop in this paper we shall assign a model to both theories. The intuition we use is that, in the intended interpretation, s q(x; y) if s r(x; y) and t p(u; v) where x is the name of u and y is the name of v. The semantics of the example program would be: t 7 ! fp(a; b); p(b; c)g s 7 ! fr(n a ; n b );q(n a ; n b );demo(t;atom(n p ; n a ; n b ]))g:
Before we proceed further an explanation of some our notation will be helpful. We use typewriter style fonts for program code and mathematical style fonts for logical expressions, such as syntax, models and proofs. We also observe some conventions about names. A constant 'a' is named 'na' in program code and 'n a ' in expressions. Table 1 contains some examples to make the convention clear. We emphasise that the formatting of the symbols is purely a convention and has no logical significance. In particular, the two glyphs np and n p are exactly the same symbol in the language. We now informally motivate the choice of semantics for amalgamated programs through a short sequence of examples. We need to explain three further points about our naming relation for these examples:
Let a be a constant. Then as we have said its name is written as n a . The name of n a is formed using the function symbol prim=1: prim(n a ) is the name of n a .
Let f(t 1 ; : : :;t n ) be a term. The name of this term is formed using the function symbol func=2: func(n f ; n t1 ; : : :; n tn ])is the name of the term f(t 1 ; : : :;t n )
where n f is the name of f and n ti is the name of t i for each i. To abbreviate some expressions we use Quine's corners to form names.
For example the expression pr(a; b)q is used as a shorthand for the name of r(a; b). The corners are not part of the logical language.
Consider this program: t = { p(X, Y) <-r(X,Y). r(a,b). } s = { q(X, Y, Z) <-u(X, Y), v(Z). u(d, e). v(g). }
It is clear that a very simple construction will build up a "model" of the program composed of these two theories. For example, the least Herbrand Models are: t 7 ! fr(a; b); p(a; b)g s 7 ! fv(g); u(d; e); q(d; e; g)g and it would be natural to define the "meaning" of the program to be these two models.
This is a very simple example as there is no overlap in predicate symbols nor in constant symbols. What if there is an overlap in predicate symbols? Consider:
t = { p(X, Y) <-r(X, Y). r(a, b). } s = { p(X, Y) <-v(X, Y). r(d, e). v(f, g). }
The least Herbrand Models of t and s are now t 7 ! fr(a; b); p(a; b)g s 7 ! fp(f; g); r(d; e); v(f; g)g:
In this example the union of the least Herbrand models of s and t is a subset of the least Herbrand model of s t which is t s 7 ! fr(a; b); r(d; e); v(f; g); p(a; b); p(f; g); p(d;e)g:
Now we consider the use of demo in rules. Consider this program: The least Herbrand model of s is s and it is natural to take the intended meaning of t to be fp(n a ; n b );p(n b ; n c );demo(s;pr(a;b)q);demo(s;pr(b;c)qg:
We can now formulate a system which has two mutually recursive theories:
t = { p(X, Y) <-demo(s, atom(nr, X, Y])). q(a, b). } s = { r(X, Y) <-demo(t, atom(nq, X, Y])). }
In this case we would expect q(a; b) to be true in a model for t. A natural step to take is to say that demo(t; atom(n q ; n a ; n b ])) is true in the corresponding model for s and hence that r(n a ; n b ) is also true. A similar step is made to say that p(prim(n a );prim(n b )) is true in the model for t. The least models we obtain are therefore t 7 ! fq(a; b); p(prim(n a );prim(n b ));demo(s;pr(n a ; n b )q)g s 7 ! fr(n a ; n b );demo(t;pq(a;b)q)g:
These sets of atoms are certainly (Herbrand) models of the respective theories but they contain "more" than just the (classical) ground atomic logical consequences. An "infinitely regressive" program is easily formulated:
In this situation there is no ground atom that we expect must be in a Herbrand model for either t or s. However, we note that if, say, we let p(a; b)
be true in an interpretation of t, then we feel compelled to say that r(n a ; n b )
is true in the corresponding interpretation of s. We would then require p(prim(n a ); prim(n b )) to be true in the interpretation for t, and then for r(func(n n ; prim(n a )]);func(n n ; prim(n b )])) to be true in the interpretation for s, and so on.
It is clear from these examples that, for the semantics we have in mind, a theory is not interpreted in isolation. The model that is ascribed to a theory has to take account of the models ascribed to other theories. We need a notion of assigning models to theories simultaneously which satisfies certain properties. This is the approach we take in developing semantics for definite metalogic programs.
Definite Metalogic Programs
A first order metalogic language L, consists of a first order language L 0 and a suitable naming relation, N L 0 , for L 0 . When the language is understood from the context we shall denote the naming relation by N. First we describe the syntax of the language and then introduce the naming relation. The following section describes the naming relation in more detail.
It is convenient to consider the constants of L to be in two distinct categories: ordinary constants and elementary names. These categories are unambiguously defined by a valid naming relation. Accordingly, the alphabet of a first order metalogic language consists of symbols from the following disjoint categories: constants C functions F elementary names E variables V predicates P connectives f^; _; ); g quantifier 8 punctuation ;, (, ).
Pis to include the binary predicate symbols demo and names. Vis countably infinite. E is not empty as it will contain primitive names for the predicate symbols demo and names at least. F and C will contain various symbols for forming structured names of strings. The details of these relationships do not affect our discussion of syntax so we postpone them until the next section.
A string of a language L is any finite sequence of symbols from the alphabet of L. For example, if the alphabet of L contains a constant symbol c and a predicate symbol p, then p(c), (cp) and ^c8p are strings of L.
The set of terms is the smallest set such that:
if c 2 C then c is a term; if e 2 E then e is a term; if v 2 Vthen v is a term; if f 2 F, has arity n and t 1 ; : : :;t n are terms then f(t 1 ; : : :;t n ) is a term. If p 2 P, has arity n and t 1 ; : : :;t n are terms then p(t 1 ; : : :;t n ) is an atomic formula.
We shall often use the term atom instead of atomic formula. where all the variables are assumed to be universally quantified, where the antecedent is understood to be a conjunction of atoms, and where the consequent is understood to be a disjunction of atoms.
The set of theories of a language L, Th L , is the set of all finite sets of formulas of L. A theory T is closed if each formula in T is a sentence. Now we come to the important definition of a system of theories. In our logic the notion of 'system of theories' plays the role that 'first order theory' does in classical logic. However, its definition makes use of the naming relation for the language so we introduce some basic properties of the naming relation. The following section covers the naming relation in more detail.
Let L be a first order metalogic language and suppose its alphabet of symbols is A. Let U L be the Herbrand Universe of L (see Section 5 for the definition of Herbrand Universe). Let A denote the set of strings generated from an
The domain of the naming relation is the set of 'names', while the range is the set of 'things named'.
The range is to be built from an alphabet including at least the symbols of L. We allow a larger alphabet than L in the range as we may want names for objects, such as refutations, which are not expressions of the language. Definition 3.1 (System of Theories) Let fT 1 ; : : :;T n g be a finite set of theories of a first order metalogic language L. We define the system of theories of fT 1 ; : : :;T n g to be the smallest set of theories M of L such that 1. fT 1 ; : : :;T n g M. This definition says that a system of theories comprises a 'kernel' and all theories whose names can be formed as ground terms arising in a demo-atom in some theory of the system. The motivation for this definition is that the system of theories contains all theories whose interpretations we will have to consider. The interpretations of a theory whose name does not appear in a demo atom do not affect the semantics of the system. We now introduce definite metalogic programs. A definite program clause is a clause of the form p(t 1 ; : : :;t n ) B 1 ; : : :;B n containing exactly one atom in the consequent. We call p(t 1 ; : : :;t n ) the head of the clause and B 1 ; : : :;B n the body. If n = 0 we have a definite unit clause. We say the clause is a defining clause for p.
A definite goal is a clause of the form B 1 ; : : :;B n that is, a clause with an empty head.
The empty clause, denoted 2, has an empty consequence and empty antecedent and is understood as a contradiction.
A definite theory is a theory where each formula is a definite program clause.
Definition 3.2 (Definite
is a system of definite theories, where for each T 2 M, no clause in T is a defining clause for demo or for names. Our specification of the naming scheme for definite metalogic programs will insist that the name of a clause defining demo or names cannot be formed. If no theory in the kernel defines demo or names then the system of theories is a definite metalogic program.
The kernel of a definite metalogic program will be the set of theories that are presented to a metalogic programming system. It will be convenient to abuse the terminology slightly by referring to the kernel as if it were the program itself. It will be clear from the context whether we are referring to the kernel or to the full system of theories.
Naming Relations
In this section we shall develop some properties we require of naming relations and propose a particular relation for definite metalogic programs. The naming relation is also known as the representation in the meta-programming literature, see for example [9] . We start by discussing the nature of the amalgamation.
The Style of Amalgamation
The amalgamation is effected by the naming relation. This relation is to allow us to write down the name of any interesting string of the language. Some strings are deemed "uninteresting" because there is no need to name them. Our naming relation for definite metalogic programs shall cover primitive symbols, terms, atoms, clauses and sets of clauses. This leaves out the logical connectives, the punctuation symbols, general formulas and all ill-formed expressions of a first order language.
In our amalgamated languages there are two special-purpose predicate symbols: demo and names. The purpose of demo is to give access to the provability relation while the purpose of names is to give access to the naming relation.
In a nutshell, names gives access to the portion of the naming relation dealing with ground terms. This includes, for example, the names of clauses and theories but not clauses and theories themselves, as these are not terms. We shall give an axiomatisation of names and show that the definition of satisfaction, in our logic, of names atoms in an interpretation amounts to provability from this axiomatisation.
The predicate demo is also a "built-in" predicate of the logic. Unlike names though, we do not give an axiomatisation for demo. Instead it is treated logically, in the definition of satisfaction and in the definition of the inference rules.
As we are dealing with a binary demo predicate, it is natural to explicitly consider collections of theories at the same time. In this situation, demo bridges the gap between theories. Therefore, there is no clear "status" for an axiomatisation of demo, no "obvious place to put it". Demo steps between theories and an axiomatisation would be a theory itself.
We could insist (or assume) that every theory has an appropriate set of defining clauses for demo (and for the naming relation). The semantics for each theory would then be as investigated by Hill and Lloyd [9] but all demo-like computations would take place at the meta-level in the current theory, rather than at the object level of the theory being queried. We want to avoid meta-level computations where we can by reflecting downwards.
Our choice is to treat demo as a built-in, that is, logical predicate of the logic. We then have to deal explicitly with a semantics and proof theory using a collection of theories. All of these theories are written in the same first order language.
The Naming Relation for Definite Metalogic Programs
We now fix on a naming relation scheme for definite metalogic programs. For the remainder of the paper we shall assume that for definite metalogic programs the naming relation follows the scheme defined here.
Constant, Function & Predicate Symbols
The set of function symbols is to include the following seven: In addition we use a constant symbol '0' and a unary function symbol 's'. These may be thought of as constructing terms for the natural numbers. The symbol empty is used to name an empty conjunction (and can arise as a definite program clause need have no antecedent).
Names
A first order metalogic language is to have a distinguished set of constants called elementary names E. The set of elementary names is included to provide names for all the non-logical symbols of the language excluding the elementary names themselves. Thus all constant, function and predicate symbols of the language are to be named by an elementary name except the elementary names. We stipulate that every non-logical symbol has exactly one elementary name and every elementary name is the name of exactly one string.
A special subset of the terms is taken as the set of names of amalgamated language strings. These terms consist of the elementary names plus the structural terms identified by Table 2 . Table 2 defines the structural portion of the naming relation of the amalgamation for definite metalogic programs. It shows how terms can be constructed to name (most of ) the syntactic entities of the object language. In the table we have used the shorthand s n (0) for n applications of the function symbol s to 0.
In Table 2 the entries for clauses are marked with a star. This is to indicate that these names are subject to the following restriction: No clause can be a defining clause for demo or for names.
We shall write h ; i 2 N L to mean that is a name for according to the naming relation N L . For definiteness, the structural portion of the naming relations for definite metalogic programs we consider shall be defined as in Table 2 . We shall sometimes refer to a 'name' or to a 'name term'. By this we shall mean a term (of the first order language under consideration) which is in the domain of the naming relation for the language we are discussing.
There are a few things missing from this formulation that we shall not require. For example we have not included names for the connectives or for the punctuation symbols. Nor do we have names for such things as proofs or derivations. The particular structural naming scheme presented can be extended to deal with the syntax of full first order theories if required. The semantics of the logic does not presume this particular naming relation; the procedural semantics of definite metalogic programs do.
We emphasise again that by convention we are denoting the elementary name of a constant, function or predicate symbol s by n s or ns depending on the context. However, this is only a convention-the elementary name of a constant, function or predicate symbol is specified by the naming relation. We finish off this section by giving some examples of structured names. We gave the following example of a theory in the the previous section:
In this example t is an elementary name, and in the naming relation, is associated with the given set of clauses. This same set of clauses also has a structured name: This name is a term of the language. A clause such as the following
can also be written as Assuming that X and Y are variables 1 and 2, the name of the first clause is
which is also a term.
Properties of the Naming Relation Scheme
We round off our discussion of the naming relation by describing some of the properties it has. We begin by repeating the domain and range properties of a naming relation given in Section 3.
Let L be a first order metalogic language and suppose its alphabet of symbols is A. Let U L be the Herbrand Universe of L (see Section 5 for the definition of Herbrand Universe). Let A denote the set of strings generated from an alphabet A.
The following properties clarify what we are assuming about N L . Basis h ; i 2 N L means is a name of . Acyclic Let t 1 ; : : :;t n be a sequence of terms from U L and suppose t 1 = t n . Then for some i; j, 1 i < j n, ht i ; t j i 6 2 N L . Functional hs; t 1 i 2 N L^h s; t 2 i 2 N L ) t 1 = t 2 .
Elementary For elementary names:
e 2 E^he; ti 2 N L ) t 2 C F P Th L and t 2 (C F P) ) (9e 2 E)he; ti 2 N L . Structured names A distinguished set of constant and function symbols are required for forming structured names. We assume the language has the appropriate symbols for the extent of the naming relation.
As the domain of the naming relation is taken to be a subset of the set of ground terms it follows that we are using a ground representation of logic programs [9] .
The acyclic condition implies that the relation is irreflexive and anti-symmetric. The functional assumption requires a name to name exactly one string. Clearly, (N E) is acyclic. If it is also functional then from Table 2 is is easy to see that N also satisfies these properties.
Our elementary name assumption identifies a subset of the constant symbols to be used as primitive names. We assume there are elementary names for each of the constant, function and predicate symbols. Theories of the language may also have elementary names but not necessarily.
The following assumptions are not made:
Onto Every element of the range has a name.
Injectivity Elements of the range have a unique name.
We do not assume that every string which can be formed in the range language is actually named. For example, we may not be able to form the names of ill-formed expressions.
Allowing primitive and structured names immediately rules out having unique names for strings. For example, we will often give theories primitive names, but they will also have structured names.
Finally, it should be clear that the naming relation N is a function. However, N ?1 is not, in general, a function. names(x 1 ; y 1 )^ ^names(x n ; y n ) where n f is the name of f, x i and y i are variables for 1 i n. The purpose of the naming theory is to be explicit about what names=2 goals can succeed. The naming theory provides an axiomatisation of names and this axiomatisation will be 'built-in' to the logic. It is not intended to be a full axiomatisation of the naming relation: such a thing is not possible.
The Naming Theory

Declarative Semantics of Definite Metalogic Programs
This section presents a semantics for first order metalogic and for definite metalogic programs. The distinguishing characteristic of this approach is the logical status accorded the two predicates demo and names, as well as the explicit treatment of collections of theories in one semantic structure. In Subsection 5.1 we present a semantics for first order metalogic and in Subsection 5.2 a semantics for definite metalogic programs. In the theory of logic programming it is common to identify the semantics of a definite program (i.e. its least Herbrand model) with a set of ground atoms (the atoms made true by the least Herbrand model). Subsection 5.3 presents several ways of describing the consequences of a definite metalogic program using a 'set of ground atoms' viewpoint. We define the notion of term assignment combining pre-interpretation and variable assignment in the usual manner. Definition 5.3 (Interpretation) Let L be a first order metalogic language and J be a pre-interpretation of L. An interpretation of L based on J is the assignment of an n-ary relation on the domain of J to each n-ary predicate symbol of L. Definition 5.4 (Theory Assignment) Let L be a first order metalogic language and let J be a pre-interpretation for L. A theory assignment for L based on J is a function assigning an interpretation based on J to each theory of L. Definition 5.5 (Satisfaction) Let T be a theory of a first order metalogic language L. Let I be a theory assignment for L based on a pre-interpretation J and let V be a term assignment based on J. We define satisfaction of a formula A of L with respect to a theory T by the theory assignment I, (written as I; T; V A), It can be seen that the truth value of a closed formula does not depend on the variable assignment and so we can speak of the truth value of a closed formula with respect to a theory and a theory assignment without any ambiguity. Definition 5.6 (Model) Let I be a theory assignment for a first order metalogic language L. I is a model of a closed formula F of a theory T if F is true with respect to I(T). I is a model of a closed theory T if I is a model of each formula of T.
A Semantics for First Order Metalogic
If a theory T has a model then we say it is consistent otherwise we say it is inconsistent. Just as a theory has a model, so we can define the concept of a "system of models" for a system of theories. Naturally, we can only assign models to consistent theories. Definition 5.7 (System of Models) Let M be a system of theories over a first order metalogic language L and let I be a theory assignment for L. Then I is a system of models for M if I is a model of each consistent theory of M.
Definition 5.8 Let T be a theory of a first order metalogic language L. We say T is satisfiable if there is a system of theories of L containing T which has a system of models assigning a model to T. We say T is unsatisfiable if there is no system of theories of L containing T which has a system of models assigning a model to T.
Definition 5.9 (Logical Consequence) Let T be a theory of a first order metalogic language L, let F be a sentence of L and let I be a theory assignment for L. We say that F is a logical consequence of T if for every system of theories M containing T, I is a system of models for M implies I(T) is a model for F.
We write T F to mean that F is a logical consequence of T. We use Cn(T )
to denote the set of ground, atomic, logical consequences of T.
We say that a theory assignment I is a system of models for a theory T, if I is a system of models for some system of theories which contains T.
Proposition 5.10 Let T be a theory of a first order metalogic language L and let F be a sentence of L. Then F is a logical consequence of T if and only if
T f Fg is unsatisfiable.
Proof
F is a logical consequence of T iff for every system of models I for T, I(T) F, iff for every system of models I for T, I(T) 6 F, iff there is no system of models for T f Fg, iff T f Fg is unsatisfiable.
2
Consider the following simple system of theories.
Using the classical definitions of satisfaction and logical consequence (as defined in for example Lloyd [12] ) we obtain:
This is not the semantics we require. The demo atom used in t is intended to access what can be proved in s. The models obtained with the classical definitions do not reflect this dependency. Now consider the definition of logical consequence given above. Consider any system of models for our example. As s is assigned a model it follows that p(a) is true and hence is a logical consequence of s. Using the third clause in the definition of satisfaction, it follows that demo(s; atom(n p ; n a ])) is true in the model of t. As we are considering any system of models it follows that demo(s; atom(n p ; n a ])) is a logical consequence of t. We then obtain q(n a ) as a logical consequence using the seventh clause in the definition of satisfaction in the normal manner. Using the above definition of logical consequence we have obtained:
fq(n a );demo(s;atom(n p ; n a ]))g which is more like the semantics we are looking for.
However, the definitions of satisfaction and logical consequence insist that a large number of atoms are logical consequences of a theory. For example, the simple theory s has an infinite number of ground, atomic, logical consequences! This is easy to see as each of the atoms in the following sequence is a logical consequence of s:
. . . It is clear from this definition that if p(t 1 ; : : :;t n ) is true in the interpretation of a theory T , then in the same theory assignment every theory, including T will satisfy the atom demo(pT q; pp(t 1 ; : : :;t n )q). The 'demo-version' of every logical consequence of any theory is therefore a logical consequence of every (consistent) theory. After we have dealt with the semantics of definite metalogic programs we shall turn to dealing with this 'problem'.
Recall also the definition of satisfaction for names-atoms:
It is clear from this definition that if hx; yi 2 N then names(x; y) is true in the interpretation of any theory T as long as names(x; y) is a ground atom (as not all pairs hx; yi 2 N can form atoms). As this definition relies solely on the naming relation a theory will always satisfy these names atoms, that is, they will be logical consequences. In particular, the ground atoms which form the logical consequences of the naming theory T (see Section 4.3) for the metalogic language will also be logical consequences of each theory. It is important to realise that the naming relation plays a central role in these semantics. The naming relation defines the context in which the semantics can be defined. A different naming relation can lead to a different semantics. The logical consequences of a theory are therefore relative to the naming relation of the language. Technically, our formulation identifies a first order metalogic language with both a set of symbols and a naming relation, so varying the naming relation for a language is 'impossible' as it leads to a different language. To be explicit consider these two systems of theories:
It is clear that t q(n a ) in the first system but not in the second. The change in definition of s leads to a different set of logical consequences for the theory t which has not itself changed. As we have said, these two systems are written in two distinct, first order, metalogic languages.
Another point to note about this approach is that the notions of a theory being consistent and being satisfiable are different. In particular, a theory may be consistent but unsatisfiable. For example,
The theory t is consistent: take a theory assignment which does not assign a model to s. Whatever is assigned to t will satisfy the single formula of t and hence be a model. However, t is unsatisfiable: any system of models must assign a model to s and a model to t. Clearly this is impossible as the interpretation of t would have to satisfy both the demo-atom and its negation. Any system of theories containing t also contains s. It follows that there can be no system of models for t.
On the other hand, s is clearly both consistent and satisfiable. The system of theories fsg has a system of models, proving satisfiability.
The Semantics of Definite Metalogic Programs
We turn now to the semantics of definite metalogic programs. We obtain metalogic analogues of the well-known results for definite logic programs [12] .
Definition 5.12 (Herbrand Universe) Let L be a first order metalogic language.
The Herbrand Universe of L, U L , is the set of terms that can be constructed using only the constants, elementary names and function symbols of L. Definition 5.13 (Herbrand Base) Let L be a first order metalogic language.
The Herbrand Base of L, B L , is the set of all atoms which can be formed using the predicate symbols of L (including demo and names) using the Herbrand Universe of L as terms. Definition 5.14 (Herbrand Pre-interpretation) Let L be a first order metalogic language. The Herbrand pre-interpretation of L is the following:
Each n-ary function symbol f is assigned the mapping from U L n to U L defined by (t 1 ; : : :;t n ) 7 ! f(t 1 ; : : :;t n ).
A Herbrand interpretation for a theory T of a language L is an interpretation for T based on the Herbrand pre-interpretation of L. A Herbrand theory assignment is a theory assignment based on the Herbrand pre-interpretation. We shall often refer to a Herbrand theory assignment as simply a Herbrand assignment and to a Herbrand system of models as a Herbrand System. Lloyd [12] gives an example of a set of formulas for which the corresponding versions of the above two results do not hold. We can give a similar example for a system of theories which is not a system of clausal theories but we have to work a bit harder as our language will contain the naming function symbols. Let t be the following set of axioms:
(1) p(a) (2) 8x; y names(x; y) ) p(x)) (3) 8x p(var(x)) (4) 8x p(prim(x)) (5) 8x; y p(func(x; y)) (6) 8x; y p(atom(x; y)) (7) 8x; y p(conj(x; y)) (8) 8x; y p(clause(x; y)) (9) 8x p(theory(x)) (10) p( ]) (11) 8x; y p(pair(x; y)) (12) (2) is satisfied. For anything constructed using the naming function symbols its denotation will be > so axioms (3) to (14) are true. Finally, axiom (15) is true as h?i is is not in ther interpretation of p.
There is no Herbrand model of this set of formulas however. Axioms (1) to (14) For (1), as K; T B 1^ ^B n it follows that I; T; B 1^ ^B n and that J; T B 1^ ^B n . As I(T) T and J(T) T we must now have that I; T A and J; T A. Hence, K; T A. 
Atom Assignments
The semantics we have described for definite metalogic programs makes no concessions to the infinite set of ground, atomic logical consequences of each theory in a program. This approach we term the "large semantics" of programs. We now describe how to obtain what we call the "small semantics" of programs.
In Section 2 we gave a series of examples of simple metalogic programs and suggested what their semantics should be. The semantics suggested in that section was the small semantics. For example the semantics of the following definite metalogic program This semantics is not a system of models for fs; tg as, for example, demo(s; pr(a; b)q)
is not true in the interpretation of s. (In fact, this assignment is not even a theory assignment as it violates the structural definition of satisfaction for demo atoms as well as not satisfying any names atoms).
However, we note that this semantics does assign a classical model to each of the two theories. By 'classical model' we mean a model according to the classical definition of satisfaction where demo and names are treated as ordinary predicate symbols. It is this fact that justifies our calling the "small semantics" a semantics of definite metalogic programs.
Another way to look at the small semantics of metalogic programs is as a description of a of systems of models. In the theory of logic programming, as developed by Lloyd in [12] for example, the least Herbrand model of a program is regarded as a natural interpretation of the program. The least Herbrand model is identified with the subset of the Herbrand base which it satisfies. This identification is so pervasive in the theory of logic programming that Herbrand models are often thought of as if they were sets of ground atoms.
The justification for considering models as sets of atoms is that for Herbrand interpretations, what distinguishes one Herbrand interpretation from another one, is the set of ground atoms it satisfies. This allows Herbrand models to be thought of as sets of ground atoms.
In a similar way, the small semantics we describe now, can be thought of as the portion of a Herbrand theory assignment which distinguishes one theory assignment from another. It turns out that a theory assignment can be distinguished by subsets of the set of ground atoms which are satisfied. One of these subsets gives us the small semantics. 
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We denote the least, classical, Herbrand model of a theory T by M T . We denote the fact that a formula F is a classical logical consequence of a theory T by T C F. An atom assignment is not a theory assignment. It does not assign interpretations to theories; it assigns sets of ground atoms. We give an example to shed some light on this definition. Consider this system of theories:
Suppose we define the theory assignment I as follows:
I(s) 7 ! fp(a); : : :g I(t) 7 ! fq(n a );r(n a );demo(s;atom(n p ; n a ]));:::g Let J, K and L be the following atom assignments:
! fq(n a );r(n a )g K(t) 7 ! fq(n a );demo(s;atom(n p ; n a ]))g L(t) 7 ! fq(n a );r(n a );demo(s;atom(n p ; n a ]))g
Then, L is a small atom assignment for I but J and K are not. Proof As small assignments preserve ordinary atoms it follows that for each theory I and J satisfy the same ordinary atoms. As demo atoms arise only from the satisfaction of ordinary atoms it follows that I and J satisfy the same demo atoms in each theory. Moreover, models in a system satisfy the same set of names atoms by definition. The result now follows.
This proposition formalises the notion that a small assignment characterises a Herbrand system. Small assignments are not the only possible characterisation of Herbrand systems. There is indeed a smaller characterisation possible. This is an even stronger statement of characterisation of Herbrand theory assignments. Why do we prefer the small semantics to the tiny semantics? The following property is the main reason: let T be a theory and I be a system of models for T. Then for every ground instance, A B 1 ; : : :;B n , of a clause in T where fA; B 1 ; : : :;B n g I(T), we have fA; B 1 ; : : :;B n g I (T). This property is not satisfied by tiny assignments.
We finish off this section with an example of the various kinds of semantics that we have defined. Consider our first example program again: 
Procedural Semantics of Definite Metalogic Programs
In this section we define a procedural semantics for definite metalogic programs. We use two inference rules: resolution and reflection. The resolution rule is similar to that used in classical logic programming, the difference being in the definition of unification. Reflection is used to move from a demo goal to another goal. As we have no axiomatisation of demo, reflection is the only way to treat demo goals. Reflection is only applicable to demo goals. For names goals we use resolution in the naming theory, Our reflection rule is constructive and not ground. By this we mean that the arguments of a demo atom which is being reflected need not be ground. Variables occurring in the atom can be bound to terms thus giving an exchange of information between the 'sending' theory and the 'receiving' theory. This exchange is essential for practical programming purposes.
It does not come without a price however. Constructive reflection is not sound. Fortunately, the unsoundness is easily explained and easily controlled. Our soundness result provides the appropriate control.
We do not attempt a complete procedural semantics in this paper. We choose to concentrate on dealing with constructive reflection ignoring the complexities that a complete procedural semantics would bring through the need for negation.
Negation is introduced in definite metalogic programs by trying to reflect a demo goal involving a clause. For example, demo(s; clause(x; y)). This atom postulates that the given clause is a consequence of the given theory and this may very well be the case. To reflect this onto a goal that can be solved in the theory s requires us to handle negation, disjunction and possibly quantification.
We leave this for future work.
To state our completeness results we need an idea of what consequences of a metalogic program we expect to be able to prove. Such an idea is given by the notion of an atomic consequence: This definition requires that if demo( ; ) is an atomic consequence of some theory, then is a term built using the function symbol atom and similarly for any atomic consequence named within .
Atoms of the form demo(p q; p 1^ ^ n q) are excluded from this definition as are any other kind of compound consequence. Extending the constructive reflection rule to handle conjunctions of atoms would not be difficult, but we choose to leave it outside the scope of this paper.
It is clear that the atomic consequences of a theory T are a subset of the ground atoms which are logical consequences, that is, A T Cn(T ).
In classical logic programming, the atomic consequences of a program are what is computed and indeed, through the identification of Herbrand models with sets of atoms, are taken to be the 'meaning' of the program. The reason why it is necessary to explicitly identify a class of 'atomic consequence' in definite metalogic programs is that the classical notion of atomic consequence and that of sentential consequence are mutually recursive in metalogic.
For example, consider the atom demo(s; p(8x)p(x)q). If the sentence (8x)p(x)
is a logical consequence of s then, we know that demo(s; p(8x)p(x)q) is a logical consequence of any theory in the system. However, regarding this atom as 'merely' an atomic consequence is dubious. It is an atom, but it is not a simple, atomic consequence. The notion of simple, atomic consequence is formalised in our definition above.
To characterise the semantics we are dealing with now we can reconsider the definition of satisfaction. Suppose we replaced the clause defining the satisfaction of demo atoms by the following clause: I; T; V demo( ; ) if hV ( );Si 2 N, hV ( );p(t 1 ; : : :;t n )i 2 N, and I; S; V p(t 1 ; : : :;t n ).
It is clear that the results proved in previous sections would still hold for this approach and that the demo atoms which are logical consequences of a theory would now be strictly the atomic consequences as we defined them above.
We shall prove the completeness of our procedural semantics with respect to the notion of atomic consequence.
Our formulation of (SLD) resolution is standard, in particular, we do not attempt to restrict the choice of an input clause at the resolution step. This means that we can perform "too many" resolutions as goals are intended to be solved in particular theories. Our solution is to tag atoms with the theory they are to be resolved in and to enforce the integrity of the procedure by appropriately constraining derivations and refutations.
We begin the development of our procedural semantics by introducing quoted forms. These are special types of expression produced during reflection and motivated by the need to handle the binding of variables carefully. Then we present our extensions to substitutions and to unification. Following the inference rules, we present tagging, derivations and refutations. Finally we present our soundness and completeness results.
Throughout this section goal, clause, theory and program are to be understood as meaning definite metalogic goal, definite metalogic clause and so on, as these are the only kinds of these objects that we are considering.
Quoted Forms and Reduction
In this section we define a class of expressions called quoted forms. Quoted forms are similar to the non-ground representation [9] and to unsaturated names [2] and are used to transmit information between the object-level and meta-level of the amalgamation in proofs.
Informally, if t is a term or atom then dte is a quoted form. For example, for the variable x, constant c and term f(t 1 ; : : :;t n ) we have quoted forms dxe, dce and df(t 1 ; : : :;t n )e respectively.
The notation for quoted forms should not be confused with our earlier shorthand notation for names. The name of a term t is ptq while dte is a quoted form of t. The symbols d and e are new symbols, assumed to be distinct from any symbol of the language.
Quoted forms are not data structures of the program; they are not written in a program. They are a proof-theoretic device used to transfer data between the levels of the amalgamation. They arise as a by-product of the reflection inference rule which we shall introduce below.
We do not define a unique quoted form for a term or atom. Indeed the process of unification manipulates the shape of a quoted form, each succeeding expression still being a quoted form of the original term or atom. We need a proper definition: Definition 6.2 (Quoted Form) The set of quoted forms Q of a language L is defined as the smallest set such that: if t is a term or atom then dte 2 Q; if dp(t 1 ; : : :;t n )e 2 Q and p 2 Pthen atom(n p ; dt 1 e; : : :; dt n e]) 2 Q where n p is the elementary name of p;
if df(t 1 ; : : :;t n )e 2 Q and f 2 F then func(n f ; dt 1 e; : : :; dt n e]) 2 Q where n f is the elementary name of f; if dne 2 Q and n 2 E then prim(n) 2 Q; if dce 2 Q, c 2 C , and its elementary name is n c then n c 2 Q.
For example, df(x; c)e, func(n f ; dxe; dce]) and func(n f ; dxe; n c ]) are all quoted forms assuming that c is a constant and n c is its elementary name. However, func(n f ; x; n c ]) is not a quoted form as x is not a quoted form.
In [2] , Barklund and Hamfelt discuss briefly the notion of an unsaturated name. This is a non-ground term where the variables are intended to be bound to the names of sub-terms so providing a saturated name which is a fully ground term. We use unsaturated names as the arguments to demo.
Unsaturated names contain variables, so if we want to reflect an unsaturated name we have a problem. In [2] , Barklund and Hamfelt say that "operationally, the computation of [the thing named by x] from x may have to be delayed until x is ground". Since we explicitly want to reflect using unsaturated names to transmit information between the levels of the amalgamation we cannot wait until the name is ground.
Our solution to this problem is to unify an unsaturated name with the quoted form of the head of an input clause. This will give rise to quoted variables, which we will have to deal with carefully, but the advantage is that we now know which variables have to be bound to names and not just to terms.
Informally, we quote the head of the input clause, reduce the quoted form to a normal form leaving only quoted variables, unify with the unsaturated name, and propagate the bindings as usual. Quoted variables will appear in the terms and formulas from this point on. We shall make this treatment precise when we deal with substitutions, unification and reflection.
As noted, we reduce a quoted form to a normal form leaving only quoted variables. This reduction step involves the use of the naming relation and parallels the definition of quoted form. Indeed the set of quoted forms is the smallest set containing dte for every term or atom t and closed under reduction.
Definition 6.3 (Reduction) A single step of form reduction (f-reduction) is defined as follows:
dne 7 ! prim(n) where n is an elementary name; dce 7 ! n c where c is a constant and n c is its elementary name; df(t 1 ; : : :;t n )e 7 ! func(n f ; dt 1 e; : : :; dt n e]) where n f is the elementary name of f and dt i e is the quoted form of t i for 1 i n; dp(t 1 ; : : :;t n )e 7 ! atom(n p ; dt 1 e; : : :; dt n e]) where n p is the elementary name of p and dt i e is the quoted form of t i for 1 i n;
Given a quoted form Q we shall denote by Q the string resulting from a sequence of f-reduction steps for which no further reductions are possible. It is easy to see that each step produces a quoted form and that f-reduction terminates, yielding a unique string.
There is no reduction step for a quoted variable. Given a quoted variable dxe its reduced form is dxe. Quoted variables carry bindings from one level of the amalgamation to another. Our notion of substitution is extended to deal with quoted variables. In particular, quoted variables are substitutable.
It is also clear that the reduction of the quoted form of a ground term or atom yields the structured name of the expression i.e. for a ground term or atom t, ptq = dte.
Here is a simple example of a reduction: x is a variable, a is a constant, n is an elementary name and f is a ternary function symbol.
df(x; a; n)e 7 ! func(n f ; dxe; dae; dne]) 7 ! func(n f ; dxe; n a ; dne]) 7 ! func(n f ; dxe; n a ; prim(n)]):
The sequence of individual steps is unimportant. Note that f-reduction does not transform a quoted form into a 'pure' object level term or atom. F-reduction removes quotes forming a non-ground term, similar to a structured name. Quoted variables remain in the result. From now on, 'term' shall mean term of the first order metalogic language or quoted form.
Unification
Definition 6. 4 An expression is a term, a literal or a conjunction of literals. Definition 6.5 A substitution is a finite set of the form fx 1 =t 1 ; : : :; x n =t n g where each x i is a variable or quoted variable, each x i is distinct, each t i is a term distinct from x i , if x i is a quoted variable then t i is a quoted form, and if x i =s and dx i e=dte both appear in the set then s = t. fx 1 ; : : :;x n g is the domain and ft 1 ; : : :;t n g the range of the substitution.
Quoted variables are treated as distinct, so if x and y are distinct variables then fdxe=dyeg is a substitution. Definition 6.6 Let = fx 1 =t 1 ; : : :; x n =t n g be a substitution and E be an expression. Then E , the instance of E by is the expression obtained from E by simultaneously applying the following two rules: for a binding x i =t i replace every occurrence of x in E by t i ; for a binding dx i e=dt i e, replace every occurrence of x in E by t i .
For example, let E = f(dxe; y; z) and = fx=a; y=dxe; dze=n b g then E = f(dae; dxe; b).
Our definition of the composition of substitutions is almost the same as in Lloyd [12] . The difference is that it deletes more bindings in the last step. For example, let = fx=f(y); dye=zg and = fx=a; y=b; z=daeg. Then = fx=f(b); dye=dae; z=daeg. Definition 6.8 (Name Substitutions) Let L be a first order metalogic language and E be an expression. We say that = fdx 1 e=t 1 ; : : :; dx n e=t n g is a name substitution for E if each t i (1 i n) is a name of a ground term; and dom( ) contains all quoted variables of E.
By applying a name substitution to an expression we remove all quoted variables and, by the definition of substitution, in a manner consistent with unquoted variables. For example, let E = p(dxe; x) and = fdxe=n a g, then E = p(n a ; a).
The motivation for name substitutions is apparent from the following lemma: 
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If S = fE 1 ; : : :;E n g is a finite set of expressions and is a substitution then S denotes the set fE 1 ; : : :; E n g. If S = fE 1 ; : : :;E n g is a finite set of expressions then S denotes the set fE 1 ; : : :; E n g. Definition 6.10 Let S be a finite set of expressions. A substitution is called a unifier for S if S is a singleton. A unifier for S is called a most general unifier (mgu) for S if, for each unifier of S, there exists a substitution such that = .
For example, let S = fp(dae); p(n a )g. Then S = fp(n a )gwhich has the identity substitution as mgu.
Let T = fp(dxe; f(a); y); p(n a ; x; dze)g. Then T = T . T is not unifiable as any mgu must contain the bindings dxe=n a and x=f(a) simultaneously.
T 0 = fp(dxe; a; y); p(n a ; x; dze)g is unifiable. T 0 = T 0 and fdxe=n a ; x=a; y=dzeg is an mgu as is fdxe=n a ; x=a; dze=yg. In fact, there is hardly any difference at all between and d e. The proof of Proposition 6.13 shows that if is an mgu of fA; Bg then is an mgu of fdAe; dBeg. Propositions 6.12 and 6.13 show that and d e are interchangeable. This justifies our usage of the mgu of an expression as we still have a unique equivalence set of substitutions upto variable renaming.
It is possible to generalise the concepts we have introduced here to cope with the naming version of any substitution. We would need to allow 'nested' quoted forms, such as ddxee, f-reduction would be extended appropriately, as would the application of a substitution. However, this generality is not needed in this paper.
Inference
Now we turn to the inference rules of the system. There are two: resolution and reflection. The resolution rule is standard but uses the new form of unification. The reflection rule is used on demo goals. The resolution step places no restriction on the input clause that is used. However it is clear that our notion of derivation must respect the "origin" of the goal by solving atoms in the correct theory. For this purpose we will introduce the "tag" of an atom. This provides book-keeping facilities for use in derivations, recalling where we will search for input clauses.
We introduce the following special 'system' theory D: Notice the use of the quoted form of the head of the input clause, unifying with the unsaturated names in the demo atom. The use of to unify with allows the reflection of demo and names atoms. In effect, each theory is extended with the axioms of D.
Unification is a symmetric process in the sense that when unifying two variable terms the unifier can chose to substitute either one for the other. This is a problem in our reflection step as reflection is not symmetric: the choice must always be to substitute the quoted form of the variable in the input clause for the variable in the demo atom.
To see why this is the case consider the goal demo(s; atom(n p ; x])); r(x) and let p(y) q(y) be a clause in the theory s. Using reflection we attempt to unify the set fatom(n p ; x]); dp(y)eg. This set becomes fatom(n p ; x]); atom(n p ; dye])g after f-reduction. An mgu can now be simply produced: either of fx=dyeg or fdye=xg will unify the set. According to the fifth clause in the definition of reflection the unifier chosen will be fx=dyeg.
This unifier will not change variables in the input clause so the subgoal generated will be q(y). An answer in terms of y will then propagate properly to an answer in terms of x using our rules for substitution and composition.
The non-unifier fdye=xg does not change the variables of the input clause either. (We have no way of generating a substitution for y in terms of x.) The subgoal generated will still be q(y) and the answer will also be a binding for y. However, the answer does not propagate through to x in the composition of substitutions.
Let Notice that as reflection uses an input clause and takes the body of the clause to form new goals it includes a resolution step. It is possible to weaken reflection to reflect only, rather than reflect and resolve, in which case if the selected atom is demo(p q; p q) then would be placed in the list of goals and a further resolution step would be needed. The advantage of defining reflection this way is that we can reflect goals where the unsaturated name needs a binding for the predicate symbol which is provided by an input clause. We give an example of this later on.
It is understood that in both inference rules the variables of the goal and the input clause are standardised apart.
We now define the notion of the tag of an atom. Recall that the axiomatisation of names is given by the theory T defined in Section 4.3. Definition 6.17 (Tag) Let T be a theory of the program M.
1. If G is an initial goal A 1 ; : : :;A n then for each i, 1 i n, the tag of A i in T fGg is T unless A i is a names-atom in which case its tag is T .
2. If H is the goal A 1 ; : : :;A n , C is the clause B B 1 ; : : :;B q and G is derived from H and C using resolution, with selected atom A l and unifier , that is, G is the goal (A 1 ; : : :;A l?1 ; B 1 ; : : :;B q ; A l+1 ; : : :;A n ) ;
then for each j, 1 j q, the tag of B j is the tag of A l , the selected atom of the inference, unless B j is a names-atom in which case its tag is T .
3. If G is the goal A 1 ; : : :;A i?1 ; B 1 ; : : :;B q ; A i+1 ; : : :;A n and was derived by reflection with selected atom demo( ; ) with unifier then the tag of each
In this definition names-atoms are always tagged by the naming theory of the language. Rule 1 initialises the tags of all other atoms in a goal to the theory the goal is posed against. Rule 2 propagates a tag from goals to resolvents while rule 3 changes the tag of reflected atoms.
Derivations and Refutations
A derivation is similar to an SLD-derivation but there are now two inference rules which can be applied and there is the book-keeping question of tracking the theories in which a matching clause is to be looked for. A derivation of T fGg consists of a sequence of quadruples, Q i = hG i ; C i ; i ; T i i such that Q 0 = hG; C 0 ; 0 ; Ti where C 0 is any clause of T and 0 is the identity substitution and for i > 0, Q i = hG i ; C i ; i ; T i i where either 1. G i is derived from G i?1 and C i using mgu i by resolution, where C i is a variant of a clause of T i and T i is the tag of the selected atom; or 2. G i is derived from G i?1 and C i using mgu i by reflection, where C i is a variant of a clause of T i or of a special clause and T i = where demo( ; ) is the selected atom.
Each C i is to be a suitable variant such that it does not have any variables which appear in the derivation up to Q i?1 .
Definition 6.19 (Refutation)
A refutation of T fGg is a finite derivation of T fGg which has 2 as the last goal.
We say that a refutation has length n if G n = 2. We say that a refutation is an object level refutation if the only inference rule applied is resolution. In refutations we shall sometimes use the Prolog notation of ' ' to indicate that the component can be an arbitrary element of the appropriate type. This can happen in Q 0 where neither the input clause nor the unifier play any role.
In a derivation, the first element of each tuple is the goal. For the first tuple the other elements do not play any role. For the remaining tuples, the second element is the input clause used to derive the current goal from the previous one, using the unifier in the current tuple. The tag in the current tuple says where the input clause came from, that is, to which theory it belongs. In a derivation the tag of the input clause must match the tag of the selected atom. Note that the tag of the selected atom depends on the steps in the derivation upto the point where the atom is introduced into the goal.
We now present some refutations to help clarify the definitions given above. We start with a simple example. s = { p(a) } t = { q(X) <-demo(s, atom(np, X])), r(X) r(na) } Let our query to the theory t be q(y). A refutation is as follows:
Q 0 = h ( q(y)); r(n a );;;t
This is a refutation of length three. The sequence of unifiers used in the refutation is hfy=xg; fx=daeg; ;i:
Composing these and restricting to the variables of the original goal we get the 'answer' fy=daeg. (We will define 'answer' shortly).
The following example shows what happens when a variable is returned through the reflection step. We obtain a goal with a quoted variable. It then unifies with a name binding the variable to the thing named. The quoted variable acts like a variable. s = { p(X) } t = { q(X) <-demo(s, atom(np, X])), r(X) r(na) } Q 0 = h ( q(y)); r(n a );;;t
This refutation is also of length three. The sequence of unifiers is hfy=xg; fx=dzeg; fdze=n a gi giving the answer fy=n a g.
The next example shows that the mechanism must use input clauses in theories to match against atoms that are partially instantiated. Here the predicate symbol is to be bound. 
Again, the refutation is of length three. The sequence of unifiers is hfz=yg; fx=n p ; y=daeg; ;i giving the answer fz=daeg.
The following example shows that we can pass information through the reflection step going from a name term to a term. 
This refutation is of length four. The sequence of unifiers is hfx=n a ; z=yg; fdue=n a ; y=dveg; fv=bg; ;i giving the answer fz=dbeg. Notice that in this refutation there are two r-atoms generated as goals and each is solved in a different theory.
Soundness
We now turn to the issue of the soundness of our proof system with respect to the semantics of programs defined in earlier sections. A 1^: : :^A n ) ) is a logical consequence of T.
Definition 6.22 Let T be a theory of a program M and G a goal. A computed answer (respectively object level computed answer) for T fGg is the restriction of the composition of 0 ; 1 ; : : :; n to the variables of G where 0 ; 1 ; : : :; n is the sequence of mgus used in a refutation (respectively an object level refutation) of T fGg.
The following result shows the soundness of resolution in object level refutations and its proof is very similar to the proof of the soundness of SLD-resolution shown in Lloyd [12] . Proposition 6.23 Let M be a definite metalogic program and T be a theory of M.
Then every object level computed answer for T fGg is a correct answer for T fGg.
Proof Let G be the goal A 1 ; : : :;A m and 1 ; : : :; n be the sequence of mgus used in an object level refutation of T fGg. We have to show that 8((A 1 ; : : :;A m ) 1 : : : n )
is a logical consequence of T. As we have an object level refutation there can be no demo-atoms in the refutation, only names-atoms and ordinary atoms. We prove the result by induction on the length of the refutation.
Suppose that n = 1. This means that G is a goal of the form A where A is an ordinary atom or a names-atom. Suppose A is an ordinary atom. Then T has a unit clause of the form B and A 1 = B 1 . Since A 1 is an instance of a unit clause of T it follows that 8(A 1 ) is a logical consequence of T. Lemma 6.24 Let B be an atom and be a substitution. Then dBe = dB e . Proof Let B = p(t 1 ; : : :;t n ). Then, dBe = dp(t 1 ; : : :;t n )e = atom(n p ; dt 1 e; : : :; dt n e]) : dB e = dp(t 1 ; : : :; t n )e = atom(n p ; dt 1 e; 
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The following result constitutes the soundness result for our logic. Note the use of name substitutions. Otherwise, G may contain quoted variables but G for any name substitution does not. We have to show that 8(G ) is a logical consequence of T . We proceed by induction on the length of the refutation.
The base case is a refutation of length 1 using reflection. Suppose our goal is demo( ; ), the computed answer is , and the input clause is B . Then is an mgu for demo( ; ) and demo( ; dBe) where B is a unit clause of .
We know that The quoted form dxe does not have any declarative meaning as it is strictly a proof-theoretic notion. So, informally assign a meaning to it as follows. Let dxe denote the name of whatever x denotes. The universal closure of our atom is not true however in an arbitrary domain as whenever x does not denote a string of the language, dxe fails to denote at all.
We could introduce a special element in the domain for this case (but apart from no longer being an arbitrary domain) we would still not get the truth of the atom unless we also modified the definition of satisfaction of demo atoms to account for these cases.
This indicates a genuine problem in any amalgamated language. A statement such as (8x)p(x) binds x to names in the domain as well as the 'application' elements. It is clear that a sorted version of the logic would not need to apply name substitutions to attain the soundness result, and indeed, that the use of the name substitutions is to apply the right sort of term.
Completeness
In this section we provide a completeness result for atomic consequences. First we introduce the notion of the success set of a program which is just the same as in the classical case. Our completeness result is going to say that the success set of a theory is its set of atomic consequences. In order to show this we proceed in the same fashion as in Lloyd [12] . First we show that the success set of a theory is a subset of its atomic consequences. Then we introduce unrestricted refutations where the substitutions need only be unifiers and not most general unifiers. The 'mgu lemma' transforms unrestricted refutations into refutations of the same length.
The demo lemma shows how to construct a refutation of T f demo(p q; p q)g from a refutation of f g when is ground. Next, we provide a fixpoint operator for generating the atomic consequences and then we are in a position to show that the success set is equivalent to the set of atomic consequences.
Proposition 6.29
The success set of a theory T of a program M is contained in A T and in its least Herbrand system. Proof Let A be in the success set of T. Clearly, it suffices to show that A 2 A T .
We proceed by induction on the length of the refutation.
If we have a refutation of length 1 and the inference rule applied is resolution then A is an instance of a unit clause of T or of T . As there are no defining clauses for demo, A is an ordinary atom or a names atom and in either case is in Some terminology will help us to present our next results. Suppose we have a goal G derived from a goal G 0 using either resolution or reflection. We shall call the mgu used in the inference the mgu for the step. In the case of resolution, the mgu for the step is the mgu of the selected atom and the head of the input clause.
In the case of reflection, the selected atom is some atom of the form demo( ; ) and the mgu for the step is the mgu of demo( ; ) and demo( ; dBe) where B is the head of a clause in for an appropriate . We shall also speak of the unifier of the step in the same way.
The proof of the mgu lemma which follows is only slightly different from the proof of the corresponding result given in Lloyd [12] . 
Proof
We proceed by induction on the length of the unrestricted refutation.
Suppose n = 1. Then T fGg has an unrestricted refutation hG; C; ;; Ti; h2; C; ; #i which uses one application of an inference rule with input clause C and unifier .
Suppose is an mgu for the step. Then = for some . Furthermore, hG; C; ;; Ti; h2; C; ;#i is a refutation of G of length 1. Now suppose the result holds for n ? 1. Suppose T fGg has an unrestricted refutation hG; C 0 ; ;; Ti; hG 1 ; C 1 ; 1 ; T 1 i; : : :h2; C n ; n ; T n i of length n with input clauses C 0 ; C 1 ; : : :;C n and unifiers ;; 1 ; : : :; n . Now G 1 is derived from G and the unifier for the step is 1 . Then there exists an mgu for the step, 1 , such that 1 = for some . Thus T fGg has an unrestricted refutation hG; C 0 ; ;; Ti; hG 0 1 ; C 1 ; 1 ; T 1 i; hG 2 ; C 2 ; 2 T 2 i : : :h2; C n ; n ; T n i of length n with input clauses C 0 ; C 1 ; : : :;C n , unifiers ;; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; : : :; n and where G 1 = G 0 1 .
By the induction hypothesis, T fG 0 1 g has a refutation hG 0 1 ; C 1 ; ;; T 1 i; hG 0 2 ; C 0 2 ; 2 ; T 2 i : : :h2; C 0 n ; n ; T n i of length n ? 1 with mgus ;; 2 ; : : :; n such that 2 n = 2 n for some substitution . Thus T fGg has a refutation hG; C 0 ; ;; Ti; hG 0 1 ; C 1 ; 1 ; T 1 i; : : :h2; C 0 n ; n ; T n i of length n with mgus ;; 1 ; 2 ; : : :; n such that 1 n = 1 2 3 n = 1 2 n . The result now follows. Before we can prove that the set of atomic consequences is a subset of the success set of a theory we need to be able to generate the set of atomic consequences using some kind of consequence operator. We now provide an appropriate operator for doing so. We assume familiarity with the notions of fixpoints of operators (for example, lattice, lub, and monotonicity). Lloyd [12] has all the required definitions. 
}(J)(x).
Suppose A is an ordinary atom. Then there is a ground instance A A 1 ; : : :;A n of a clause in x such that fA 1 ; : : :;A n g I(x). Therefore, fA 1 ; : : :;A n g J(x) and so A 2 }(J)(x).
Suppose A is a demo atom, demo(p q; p q). Then 2 I( ). So 2 J( ) and hence A 2 }(J)(x).
Suppose A is a names atom, names( ; ). Then A 2 T (I(x)). By monotonicity of T , A 2 T (J(x)) and the result follows.
2
In order to show that } M is continous we have to show that for every directed subset X of , } M (lub(X)) = lub(} M (X)). That is, for any theory T of M, A 2 } M (lub(X))(T) iff A 2 lub(} M )(T). Before proving this result we clarify the domains of the sets and functions we are dealing with.
We have defined } M to be a mapping on , that is, } M : ! . This means that, } M :
If X is a subset of , then } M (X) really means f} M (x) : x 2 Xg. So } M (X) P(Th M ! PB L ) and hence lub(} M (X)) 2 P(Th M ! PB L ). Proof By definition, A 2 } M (lub(X))(T) iff A A 1 ; : : :;A n is a ground instance of a clause of T and fA 1 ; : : :;A n g lub(X)(T ) or A = demo(p q; p q) and 2 lub(X)( ) or A = names( ; ) and A 2 T (lub(X)(T)) iff A A 1 ; : : :;A n is a ground instance of a clause of T and fA 1 ; : : :;A n g I(T), for some I 2 X or A = demo(p q; p q) and 2 I( ), for some I 2 X or A = names( ; ) and A 2 T (I(T)), for some I 2 X iff A 2 } M (I)(T), for some I 2 X iff A 2 lubf} M (I) : I 2 Xg iff A 2 lub(} M (X)).
We define the ordinal powers of } in the normal way:
}"0 = ? }"k = }(}"(k ? 1));where k is a successor ordinal }" = lubf}"k : k < g; where is a limit ordinal: By Propositions 6.34, 6.35 and the results on fixpoints given in Lloyd [12] we have that } has a least fixpoint and its closure ordinal is !. Proof By Proposition 6.29 we need only show that the set of atomic consequences is a subset of the success set. Let us denote the success set of a theory T by S T .
By Proposition 6.36 A T = } M "!. We proceed by induction on n.
Let n = 1. Then A 2 } M "1 means that there is a ground instance A of a clause in T or T . Clearly, we can construct a refutation of T f Ag.
Assume the result holds for k < n and consider A 2 } M "n. Suppose A = demo(p q; p q). Then 2 } M "(n ? 1)( ). By the induction hypothesis f g has a refutation and by the demo lemma we obtain a refutation of T f Ag.
Otherwise, there is a ground instance B B 1 ; : : :;B k of a clause in T or T where A = B and fB 1 ; : : :;B n g } M "(k ? 1)(T). By the induction hypothesis, T f B i g has a refutation for each i, 1 i k. As each B i is ground these refutations can be combined into a refutation of T f (B 1 ; : : :;B k ) g. So T f Ag has an unrestricted refutation and we obtain a refutation by applying the mgu lemma.
7 Relation to Other Work
Bowen and Kowalski [3] are usually credited with bringing meta-programming issues to the attention of the logic programming community and following on from this work we can identify three broad and interacting areas of research:
the foundations of metalogic and metalogic programming; the semantics of particular meta-programs and of Prolog meta-programming;
and the design of practical metalogic languages for programming.
The foundations of metalogic has been relatively unexplored with the work of Subrahmanian being an exception [16] . The semantics of Prolog meta-programs has received some attention, the work of Hill and Lloyd [9] being particularly influential. The design of metalogic programming languages has been a slow process but there have now been several proposals including Gödel [10] , Reflective Prolog [6] and Quote-Prolog [4] .
Subrahmanian's approach [16] uses meta-variables and several reserved predicate symbols including a one place demo. Quantification over meta-variables is not allowed and programs consist of ordinary clauses and scheme clauses built our of meta-variables, terms and a quoting operator. For example, p(dV 1 V 2 e) q(a) is a scheme clause where V 1 and V 2 are meta-variables. Reserved predicate symbols do not appear in the heads of clauses.
The metaclosure of a program is obtained by substituting for the metavariables to obtain all formula instances of clauses using meta-variables and clauses axiomatising the reserved predicates. This yields an infinite definite logic program. A interpretation is a model of the (finite) metalogic program iff it is a model of the infinite logic program.
Subrahmanian defines an operator on interpretations dealing with ordinary predicates in the usual manner and treating the reserved predicate symbols specially. The most important case is for demo: demo(dF e) 2 (I) , F 2 I _ (demo(dF F 0 e) 2 I^demo(dF 0 e) 2 I):
The following example is used to show that the operator is not continuous. Let M be the program: p demo(p(8x) q(x)q) q(a) q(s(x)) q(x):
Clearly all atoms of the form q(t) will be in M " ! but p will not be. Now as the models being considered are Herbrand it follows that M " ! satisfies (8x) q(x). Hence demo(p(8x) q(x)q) will be in M " (! + 1) and so p will be in M " (! + 2).
This implies that is not continuous. This is a surprising result. Subrahmanian's presentation at this stage is informal but it seems clear that the operator will not yield (8x)q(x) at M "! as the definition yields only atoms. We suspect that the operator is continuous and yields only the atomic consequences as we have found in this paper. The solution Subrahmanian adopts to this problem is to change the definition of satisfaction to one of forcing, where one interpretation can refer to another. This says that an interpretation "forces" a universally quantified formula if and only if that universally quantified formula is true in all models of the program. Note that an interpretation can force a formula even though the formula is false in the interpretation. From here Subrahmanian recovers analogues of the standard results.
This approach does not seem effective as it involves quantifying over every structure for the program. It does not affect the example either as (8x)q(x) is not true in every structure and so is not forced. Thus demo(d(8x)q(x)e) is not true in the least fixpoint, which does not seem to be what the author wanted. Subrahmanian also addresses unification and resolution. He defines the notion of meta-unifiability, meta-resolvent and meta-deduction. He does not define "meta-unifier" despite the resolution step depending on the meta-unifier. The definition of meta-unifiability is straightforward but by ignoring the definition of meta-unifier some of the subtlety of meta-unification is missed. Soundness and completeness results are stated but not proved (completeness for a subclass of programs and queries).
Hill and Lloyd [9] study the semantics of the "vanilla" meta-interpreter and the metalogical facilities of Prolog such as var/1. They define two representations of programs: one where variables are represented by meta-variables and one where variables are represented by ground terms.
Using a typed language Hill and Lloyd study the semantics of the vanilla interpreter extended with a non-ground representation of an object program. They show the equivalence of consequences of these programs modulo the representation.
Hill and Lloyd's meta-programs are strictly meta-level programs. They do not mix object and meta level atoms. As such Hill and Lloyd are not studying amalgamated programs. They base their treatment of Prolog's meta-logical facilities on the ground representation rather than the non-ground representation and this is also true of their recent work on Gödel [10] .
De Schreye and Martens [15] reconsidered the semantics of untyped, vanilla meta-programs using the non-ground representation. For the class of language independent programs (a generalisation of range restricted programs) they were able to show the equivalence of object program and strict meta-program. In particular, they obtain a one to one correspondence between atoms p(t 1 ; : : :;t n ) in the model of the object program and atoms demo(pp(t 1 ; : : :;t n )q) in the model of the meta-program. They also considered limited forms of amalgamation through various textual combinations of the object program and meta-program.
Levi and Ramundo generalised these results to definite object programs in [11] by using the S-semantics [7] of programs rather than the least Herbrand model semantics. Levi and Ramundo also consider an "amalgamated vanilla" metainterpreter which has a clause for dealing with demo atoms in the "object" program obtaining a version of their results for this case also.
The declarative semantics of Gödel [10] are based on the ground representation of [9] . The proposal of Cervesato and Rossi [4] also uses the ground representation but includes primitive as well as structured names. In fact, every string has both a primitive and a structured name. The primitive name is in effect simply the quotation of the string itself. The semantics are not discussed in detail in [4] and the language does not seem to use reflection.
Reflective Prolog [6] does provide reflection but uses implicit rather than explicit reflection. This means that the the programmer does not write demo goals instead the system chooses when to reflect goals between object and meta level. Reflective Prolog has typed meta-variables for function and predicate symbols and the naming relation does not cope with conjunctions, clauses or theories. Costantini shows how to define the declarative and procedural semantics of Reflective Prolog attaining analogues of the classical results.
Costantini, Dell'Acqua and Lanzarone build on this work in [5] . Their aim is to represent the beliefs and knowledge of reasoning agents and their approach is to represent agents as theories in a language similar to Reflective Prolog. Communication between theories is not done with a single provability predicate such as demo but with pair of predicates for 'sending' and 'receiving'. Tell/2 enables an agent to tell another agent some fact. Told/2 is used by an agent to receive the fact from another agent. There is no commitment to passing true facts among agents using this approach. The semantics of this approach builds on the semantics of Reflective Prolog with each theory contributing a portion of the model of the program. Tell is meant to be used in the heads of clauses and if a tell atom is derived then its told equivalent is also derived.
Conclusions
Metalogic programming needs a sound logical base. We have defined a simple language for amalgamated metalogic programming, based on definite clauses, and we have investigated a semantics for such a language.
Instead of constructing a single model of a program we construct a system of models which behaves in an appropriate manner with respect to the theories of the program. This approach allows mutually recursive and self-referential theories.
In conjunction with this semantics we developed the basis of a procedural semantics for this class of programs. We proposed an additional inference rule to reflect goals from the meta-level to the object level.
There are several topics of interest to pursue based on this work. The procedural semantics presented here did not attempt to be complete. Investigating more powerful procedural semantics to give better completeness results is an obvious direction to pursue. Extending the amalgamated language directly with negation and quantifiers both in programs and in the naming scheme would lead to a more expressive programming language. Sublanguages of metalogic suitable for databases may also be considered.
This version of metalogic is untyped. An interesting research problem would be to investigate a suitable typed language for amalgamated metalogic programming. For example, what would the type of demo be? A typed version of metalogic should lead to a better statement of soundness results.
Another direction to pursue would be to build on top of the collection of theories to provide a semantics for object oriented logic programming based on the metaphor that an object is represented as a theory.
